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I. INTRODUCTION
American legal, political, and economic history has come nearly full
circle. We began our republic with a powerful thirst for individual liberty
and economic laissez faire. After nearly a century of regulated competition,
we are returning to the humble origins of the rugged individualist.
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For nearly a century, the government has scrutinized and supervised
America's infrastructure industries to a higher degree than the rest of the
economy. Our federal government regulated various interstate activities of
airlines, bus companies, motor carriers, railroads, freight forwarders, ocean
vessels, pipelines, telecommunications, broadcasting, electricity, oil, and gas,
while the state public utility commissions regulated the corresponding intrastate
aspects. Whether regulated as "common carriers" or "public utilities," a
normative decision was reached that the "public interest" in these activities
should be protected by government oversight. Regulation subsequently was
expanded to protect public health, safety, and the environment.
But during the Ford-Carter-Reagan era, the emergence of Chicago-school
neo-classic economics as the dominant ideology of Washington, D.C., stim-
ulated by the political backlash against gargantuan, obtrusive government
and onerous taxation of the New Deal and Great Society, led to a compre-
hensive reassessment of the appropriate role of government vis-A-vis the
market. Consequently, the contemporary balance tilts strongly in favor of
private sector solutions to societal needs.
The choice between imperfect competition and imperfect regulation is
never an easy one. Either system imposes significant costs and bestows
significant benefits. This Article will identify the major philosophical schools,
trace the evolution in public policy, and assess some of the principal costs
and benefits of regulation and deregulation.'
II. POLITICAL EcoNoMIcs
The discipline of economics begins with the observation that we live in
a world of scarce resources. Ours is a small, overpopulated planet (overpop-
ulated by humans), and the insatiable demands of consumers will always
exceed the available supply of resources. Economics analyzes the way in
which societies allocate available goods and services. The law of scarcity
compels every society to have some mechanism for rationing to distribute
resources among consumers.
Government becomes a means of facilitating rationing by creating, defin-
ing, and protecting property rights. John Locke believed that when men were
in a simple state of nature, they enjoyed private property and personal liberty
unhindered. Locke further believed that as natural society became more
complex, conflicts arose, many precipitated by scarcity. 2
In part, government became a necessary shield for the weak against
Darwinist predation by the strong in contests for real and personal property.
1. For other treatments of this general subject matter, see W. JONES, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES (2d ed. 1976); R. PIERCE, JR., G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN,
EcoNoIc REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANsPORTATnON, Am UTurrms (1980); D. Bows & P.
VERnUcuM, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BusINss (1977): C. PlIIun's, JR., Tim REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTLaris (1984); L. Scw~aRz, J. FLYNN & H. FIRsT, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: GOVEmmr REGULATION (6th ed. 1985); E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, JR.,
REGULATED INDUsTRIES (2d ed. 1987).
2. See J. LoCRE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1988).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Collectively, the weak could subdue the strong. The "social contract" became
possible because individuals were willing to exchange some freedom and
liberty to gain the state's protection against oppression by the strong. The
institution of government facilitates market exchanges by creating stability
and order, and by providing currency as a medium of exchange. Government
enforcement of property rights facilitates free, noncoercive exchanges of
property, and thereby, economic growth.
I am willing to dedicate my labor to production of what you want if I
can trade it to you for what I need. But if, through your superior force, you
can take what you want from me and give me nothing but injury for my
resistance, I will not produce long. Neither commerce nor civilization can
long endure if bandits and thieves run riot, for by jeopardizing our right to
enjoy private property they can destroy our incentive to produce.' Hence, the
social contract.
There is a full spectrum of political and economic theories which econ-
omists advance and nations employ to determine how goods and services
might best be allocated-what, how, and for whom goods shall be produced.4
The theory a government embraces reflects a political conclusion that the
mechanism selected will achieve optimum social ends.
Of course, not all societies embrace market organization as the optimal
mechanism for distribution. Some societies, particularly small or primitive
ones, distribute goods and services on the basis of tradition. In many families
and some tribal societies, important property interests are owned communally.
Moreover, in a Garden of Eden environment, where the available resources
are so abundant that they exceed demand, there is little need for rationing.
But these are the rare exceptions among contemporary nations.
Let us begin our examination of the world of economics with a chart,
upon which we will rather crudely place the spectrum of major contemporary
theories. We will assume, arbitrarily, that more government control over
economic affairs is exercised on the left end of the spectrum, and that less
is exercised at the right end:
SOCIALISM CAPITALISM ANARCHY
Central Economic Laissez
Tyranny Planning Regulation Faire
EQUALITY EFFICIENCY
Distrust of Distrust of
the individual government
The ensuing discussion proceeds from left to right across this spectrum.
3. Of course, excessive taxation or regulation by government also can have a debilitating
impact upon market performance and productivity. Such is the essential thesis of the Laffer
curve.
4. U.S. Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, Study on Federal Regulation, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1978) [hereinafter Study on Regulation].
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A. Communism
Among contemporary nations at the far left of the spectrum are those
of the communist bloc, whose leaders profess faith in Marxist economic
theory. Here, we have a socialist economy, or governmental ownership of
the means of production, and central planning of the level of production,
coupled with rather tight political control over individual liberty. Indeed,
communist nations such as China and the Soviet Union have, until very
recently, tended to exert stringent control over both the economic and
political affairs of their citizens.
Communist nations, perhaps, achieve economic equality better than
many capitalist countries. However, communist nations tend to keep the
overall size of the pie smaller than do capitalist nations, and in so doing,
sacrifice the aggregate standard of living. As Paul Samuelson might say,
while central planning economies succeed in producing lots of guns, they
fail to provide much butter. Tank production takes priority over consumer
goods.
In the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx hypothesized that capitalism
was doomed. In Das Kapital, Marx observed the excesses of laissez faire
during the nascent industrial revolution-the tragedy of child labor, the
absence of wage and hour limitations, and the growing number of industrial
injuries. Marx concluded that these injustices were the seeds of destruction
for capitalism. He felt that workers were enslaved in an economic system
in which the rich became richer, and the poor became poorer.
On the surface, workers apparently bargained freely for the sale of
their labor. But Marx saw capitalism as little different from feudalism or
slavery, for the worker produced more than enough to sustain himself,
giving the excess of his labor as profit to the master. The worker had little
choice but to submit to this disguised form of slavery, for his alternative
was starvation. Thus, according to Marx, capitalists exploited workers by
paying them less than the fruits of their production. Capitalists shared the
passion of the miser for wealth as wealth. But unlike the miser, whose
passion is idiosyncratic, Marx saw the capitalist's greed, and his consequen-
tial exploitation of labor, as an inevitable product of capitalism. Marx
found all this morally repugnant.
Marx also thought that the capitalist system was anarchical, resulting
in tremendous inefficiency, overproduction, and much waste. Without ra-
tional planning, not only did the capitalist system produce waste, the system
led inevitably to a boom and bust economic cycle, causing much social
harm. Moreover, Marx saw the scale of organization in the capitalist system
as leading inevitably to greater concentrations of wealth, with giant cor-
porations dominating the market and conspiring among themselves to sup-
press competition.
Marx saw the abuses of capitalism-the exploitation of labor, the
anarchical economic system, and the concentrations of wealth-as leading
inevitably to a class struggle in which the proletariat would rise up and
seize power from the bourgeois. But Marx proved to be a poor prophet.
He failed to anticipate the growth of trade unions and universal suffrage,
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
both of which were powerful forces in alleviating the abuses of industrialism.
Economic and social regulation tempered the political and economic power
of the wealthy.
No industrial state has had a "workers' revolution." Nonetheless,
Marx's egalitarian views are the rhetorical cornerstone of the fundamental
communist doctrine: "from each, according to his ability; to each, according
to his needs." Marx also believed that in a communist regime, eventually
the state would wither away and economic goods would be distributed
equally. But no government has been able to achieve a Marxist utopia (or
any other utopia for that matter), perhaps because man is an imperfect
beast.
Critics claim that the communist system is so flawed that it can only
exist by employing totalitarian coercion, or tyranny, to suppress individual
liberty. Thus has political freedom been sacrificed at the altar of economic
theory.
B. Socialism
Also on the left of the spectrum is the socialist model, in which the
state dictates all major economic decisions and owns the means of produc-
tion. In the sense intended here, socialist governments (such as the Scan-
dinavian nations) tend to interfere in their citizens' economic affairs, but
leave them relatively free politically. Karl Marx saw socialism merely as a
transitional stage of society between capitalism and communism, distin-
guished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done.
In socialist nations, central planners dictate the level of production,
distribution, and price. In theory, the planners avoid the chaos of anarchy,
and the inefficiency and waste of duplication. A nation need not squander
its resources on a dozen different colors of toilet paper when one will do
the job nicely. In theory, costs will be lower, because not only will wasteful
duplication be eliminated, but of the four components of production (i.e.,
wages, rent, interest, and profit), profit can be returned to consumers in
the form of lower prices.
In reality, central planners have the difficult if not impossible task of
supervising a nation's economy. Inevitably, the central planners often un-
derestimate or overestimate the type and quantity of products consumers
want, resulting sometimes in shortages or excess supply, respectively. Central
planning also tends not to produce the incentives of the market for mana-
gerial efficiency and worker productivity achieved by systems in which the
producer enjoys a profit for his innovation and efficiency. Profit, it seems,
is a powerful motivator. As we shall see below, this realization has led
some nations to decentralize production and investment decisions, giving
more autonomy to the local level, and creating economic incentives for
superior performance.
C. Economic Regulation
On the spectrum, economic regulation is somewhere between laissez
faire and anarchy, at one extreme, and socialism and communism at the
[Vol. 46:1
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other. Economic regulation is a mix of private ownership of the means of
production (capitalism), with government control of certain aspects of
pricing and level of production, as well as protection of public interest
values beyond allocative efficiency. Typically, a government agency is es-
tablished to regulate entry into and exit from the industry (usually by issuing
licenses, or certificates of "public convenience and necessity"), rates (which
must ordinarily be "just and reasonable"), the level of service (which must
be adequate), and various corporate activities, such as mergers and acqui-
sitions (with antitrust scrutiny).
Private ownership creates a stimulant for efficiency and productivity.
Regulation allows many business decisions to be made on the basis of
market forces. Indeed, economic regulation often attempts to replicate the
pricing and service levels that would exist in a competitive market, while
ensuring the protection of public interest values which are not a high priority
in a laissezfaire environment. This Article will provide a detailed explanation
of the economic and social rationales for regulation.
D. Capitalism
In a capitalist or market economy, the rationing decision is generally
left to the impersonal functioning of the "price system." In the "price
system" buyers bid for desired goods and services, and those items are
distributed to individuals paying the highest price. Here, the means of
production are privately owned: private decisions rather than state control
determine individual or corporate investments in capital goods. In a com-
petitive market, consumer demand determines the level of price, as well as
quality and quantity of production. The price system ensures that resources
are distributed to their highest valued use, as measured by the amount of
capital buyers are willing to expend for their purchases. Economists describe
such a distribution as "allocative efficiency." We will again examine these
concepts below, when we discuss market theory.
E. Libertarian Theory
At the opposite end of the spectrum from communism and socialism is
libertarian theory. In its purist essence, libertarian theory insists that men
should be freed wholly from the reigns of government. At its logical extreme,
libertarian theory suggests private ownership of the means of production,
with entrepreneurs providing both public and private goods and services
with little or no government oversight. To a true libertarian, even police
protection and highways are candidates for privatization. Conservative leader
William F. Buckley, Jr., has analogized libertarian ideology to poetry: both
are pleasing to the ear, but neither has much to do with the world in which
we live.
III. ISLANDS IN THE STREAM
The economic systems of nations appear to be in a state of flux. Each
generation experiments, tinkers with, and fine tunes the system it inherited.
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Ours is no different. Economic collapse may induce radical political change,
even revolution, and economic restructuring. But in an environment of
stable economic growth, change is usually gradual. Let us examine three
examples of a metamorphosis to the right, which may reflect a contemporary
global trend.
A. China and the Soviet Union: Retreat from Communism
Since the death of Chairman Mao, the leaders of the Peoples Republic
of China have marched steadfastly toward freeing private enterprise to
compete in the global economy. Having witnessed the economic miracles of
Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which were accomplished
on the foundations of capitalism, China's contemporary leaders appear to
be willing to relinquish the reigns of economic power to individual entre-
preneurs to stimulate national economic growth. Whether China's leaders
will follow suit with correspondingly expanded political liberty remains to
be seen.
In 1997, China annexes the British colony of Hong Kong, the crown
jewel of Asian prosperity. If instead, Hong King annexed China, China's
economy might eventually dwarf that of dominant Japan.
To the north, in a bold move away from the rigid bureaucratic socialism
which has dominated the Soviet Union for seventy years, Mikhail Gorbachev
is leading his nation away from central planning toward decentralization of
economic planning and production. With new policies of glasnost (openness)
and perestroika (political and economic restructuring), the U.S.S.R. seems
to be heading West in its political and economic ideology. Here again, only
time will tell whether such profound change will be sustained.
B. Britain: Retreat From Socialism
Most nations are somewhere in the middle of the above spectrum. The
dynamics are such that all vibrant economies are moving across the plane,
toward more or less government control over economic affairs. For example,
Britain's Thatcher government is in the process of relinquishing state own-
ership of a number of industries (such as the airline, airport, telephone,
aerospace, automobile, and coal industries) walking away from socialism,
toward privatization. 5
C. The United States: Retreat From Regulation
Note also that different sectors of a nation's economy can be represented
at various points along the spectrum. For example, in the United States,
grocery stores enjoy a relatively laissez faire environment, pipelines are
regulated as natural monopolies, and our postal system is socialized.
5. Indeed, the entire European Economic Community appears to be moving in the
direction of enhanced competition. See Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liber-
alization of EEC Air Transport, 53 J. Am L. & COM. 615 (1988).
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But not even grocery stores are wholly free from regulation. For
example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture inspects the food a grocery
store sells; the store's relationships with labor in areas such as wages, hours,
discrimination, and workers' compensation are regulated; and they pay taxes
and contribute to their employees' social security.
In two centuries of existence, the United States has also wandered across
the spectrum. We began this representative democracy with a thirst for
man's freedom and a taste for laissez faire, particularly once our Consti-
tution eliminated interstate barriers to trade in 1787. Nearly a century later,
Congress established the nation's first independent regulatory agency, the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
While moving away from pure laissez faire, the United States has
remained among the freest of the world's nations. American citizens enjoy
tremendous political, religious, and economic liberty. The Bill of Rights
and the U.S. Constitution guarantee political and religious freedom. While
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide some measure of protection
against deprivation of property without due process, 6 individual economic
liberty does not get the same measure of protection that the Constitution
and Bill of Rights commend to political and religious freedom.
In Nebbia v. New York,7 a case involving the regulation of milk prices,
the United States Supreme Court articulated among its most generous views
regarding the scope of legitimate government intervention in the market.
Noting that the dairy industry was not a public utility, the Court nevertheless
found the industry affected with a public interest:
The phrase "affected with a public interest" can, in the nature of
things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason,
is subject to control for the public good.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to
override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discrim-
inatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied .... 8
6. Generally, however, government enjoys wide latitude to regulate monopoly practices.
See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n. v Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974). However, pricing regulation
may be deemed unconstitutional if "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to
the policy the legislature is free to adopt." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). "[A] legitimate and rational
goal of price or rate regulation is the protection of consumer welfare." Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 858 (1960).
7. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
8. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934).
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Nevertheless, in the United States most decisions regarding consumption,
production, and investment are made in largely unregulated markets by
private entrepreneurs. In our domestic economic system, private ownership
of the means of production has been the rule, and public ownership the
exception. But notable exceptions to private ownership do exist-the postal
system, the intercity rail system (i.e., Amtrak), some of the electric utilities
(e.g., TVA), urban mass transit, highway construction, airports, public
housing, much of education, and all of national defense. Also, we have a
government monopoly in several of the "public goods," those things which
are indivisible and nonexcludable. Publicly provided services, such as na-
tional defense, police protection, and fire protection, are enjoyed by all,
except the enemies of the state. So a few governmental monopolies do exist
in our economy (including, not so incidentally, the government monopoly
on the use of deadly force). Some government monopolies are efficient and
economical; others are wasteful and lethargic. As we shall see, in the 1970s
the United States began to move away from the regime of economic
regulation which had governed its major infrastructure industries for almost
a century, and embraced deregulation.
IV. THE METAMoRPHosIs oF ECONOMIC THEORY IN TFIi UNITED STATES
A. Mercantilism
Mercantilism was the dominant philosophy in England prior to the
American Revolution. Born during the decline of feudalism, mercantilism
was a doctrine which looked to government's use of its power to tax,
subsidize, impose import and export duties and subsidies, and use other
regulatory means to augment national wealth and power.9 Policies designed
to secure an accumulation of capital, particularly precious metals, a favor-
able balance of trade by importing raw materials and exporting finished
products, the development of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors of
the economy, and the establishment of foreign trading monopolies domi-
nated mercantilist England.
Mercantilists generally embraced the ancient psychological views that
man is a selfish animal. Unless such selfishness was controlled, a good
society could not emerge. Mercantilists perceived government as the only
force sufficiently strong to harness man's selfish energy to accomplish
desirable social objectives. 10
B. Market Theory
1776 was the year of two significant rebellions against mercantilism.
America's founding fathers drafted the Declaration of Independence, and
9. Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J. L. & ECON. 45, 56 (1960).
10. Id. at 56-57.
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Adam Smith published the Wealth of Nations. In The Wealth of Nations,
Smith suggested that the invisible hands of the market should be freed to
provide the quality and quantity of goods and services demanded by
consumers.
Capitalists, by investing in the means of production (labor, land,
machinery, and operating capital), satiate consumer demands for goods and
services. Consumers, acting as rational maximizers of their own personal
interests, cast dollar votes of approval by the purchase of goods and services
they desire most, thereby rewarding entrepreneurs who satisfy their wants.
Profits provide a motivation for entrepreneurs to seek out and satisfy these
consumer desires. The range of products and services offered are determined
by consumer tastes and incomes. Under this theory, the community's interest
is best served by allowing competitive market forces to determine prices,
for in a fully competitive environment pricing approaches marginal costs,
or the costs to society of the next additional unit of production." Scarce
resources are distributed by the "invisible hands" of the market system to
their highest valued use. Classic economic theory embraces the premise that
optimum efficiency is achieved when the world's resources are allocated in
a way that maximizes the welfare of consumers, as measured by their
preferences in the marketplace.
Smith believed that the division of labor stimulates productivity, and
that free trade allows a producer to produce that in which he has a
comparative advantage, thereby lowering consumer costs, and enhancing
the overall standard of living. Smith provided the intellectual foundation
for the notion that capitalist investment and profit were essential for optimal
economic growth.
The theory of perfect competition, embraced by many contemporary
neo-classic economists, is narrowly circumscribed by a set of assumptions.
First, the model assumes that property rights are privately held, exclusive,
and transferable. The model also assumes that individual actors in the
market have perfect information, behave rationally, and that both trans-
action costs and externalities are insignificant. The model further assumes
that no single producer has market power, and that all competitors are in
a state of perfect competition; none has the ability to influence price with
unilateral actions. Finally, the model assumes that the preexisting or resultant
distribution of wealth is irrelevant. Given these assumptions, the market
will clear at a price and level of output which reflects an optimum allocation
of resources. Consumers purchase goods at prices closely approximating
their marginal costs of production. Shortages are eliminated automatically
through price increases which both curtail demand and stimulate new
production.
America adopted laissez faire with some enthusiasm. Professors Louis
Jaffe and Nathaniel Nathanson eloquently explained why:
11. See id. at 60-61; Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at xi-xii.
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It was believed that if men were free to make their own self-
interested decisions whether to buy Or sell there would be produced
and exchanged the greatest amount of goods and services at the
least price. In thus subjecting human destiny to the empire of the
market, philosophers did not necessarily mean to deny social re-
sponsibility for the satisfaction of individual need. The market, it
was thought, could create and exchange better than any conscious
human agency the necessities for a good life. 2
C. From Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: The Common Law
The United States was born of a desire to cast off the dead hands of
the British government, particularly its taxes and trade restrictions. At its
inception, America was laissezfaire to the point of permitting slavery. Only
adult white male property owners had the franchise, a voting apparatus not
terribly unlike that of the modern corporation.
Nineteenth century American courts embraced laissez faire and its
doctrine of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), refusing to intervene in
market transactions except where actual fraud existed, or where the buyer
had protected himself by insisting upon an explicit warranty. Indeed, Amer-
ican rejection of the dominant English standard of strict liability and
adoption of the doctrine of negligence has been attributed to a policy of
subsidizing infant industry. 3 The prevailing theory of the period was,
perhaps, best summed up by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who insisted that the
"cumbrous and expensive machinery [of the state] ought not to be set in
motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status
quo. State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good.'
4
Thus, the Jeffersonian view that government is best which governs least
dominated nineteenth century jurisprudence.
But twentieth century American courts have resurrected early common
law doctrines such as strict liability, making a manufacturer liable for
injuries even when he was not negligent in the production of the good
which caused the harm. 5 Courts have thereby forced producers to internalize
the cost of injury to consumers caused by defects in the products they
manufacture. Courts also appear to have created a system of social welfare
for the innocent who suffer injury, transferring wealth from those with
deeper pockets (often insurance companies who spread risk more widely
among those members of the public who pay insurance premiums), to those
in need of economic assistance. Thus have courts intruded into the market
to achieve social good.
12. L. JAFFE & N. NATH-ANSON, ADmsINsTRATvE LAw 6 (4th ed. 1976).
13. See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Ray. 359
(1951).
14. O.W. HoLmEs, Tm CoMMoN LAw 96 (rev. ed. 1938).
15. The metamorphosis from caveat emptor to strict liability has been gradual. See H.
Joints, J. KIRNocHAN & A. MuraPY, LEGAL METHOD 132-219 (1988).
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The judiciary is by no means the only American legal institution which
attempts to correct perceived imperfections in the market. Although the
principle of private ownership has been largely unassailed in our domestic
economy, during three major periods in our history Congress promulgated
major regulatory programs to deal with market failure. During these periods
Congress also exercised its constitutional power and created new regulatory
agencies.
The Commerce Clause, article I, section 8, of the United States Con-
stitution, vests in Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. Except in the area of import duties, this power laid relatively
dormant during the first century of our republic.
D. Market Failure and Economic Regulation
1. Origins of Economic and Antitrust Regulation
Government regulation is by no means a new phenomenon. In fact,
government participation in the market dates from antiquity:
[R]egulation to protect consumers is almost as old as civilization
itself. Tourists to the ruins of Pompeii see an early version of the
bureau of weights and measures, a place where the townsfolk could
go to be sure they weren't cheated by the local tradesmen. Unfor-
tunately a little larceny is too common in the human species.
So regulation in some form or other is one of the prices we
pay for our complex civilization. And the more complicated society
becomes, the more need for some watching over its many parts.
We shouldn't forget that a great deal of the regulation we encounter
today in business or in our personal lives arose from a recognized
need in the past.
16
American economic regulation was born in an evironment of market
failure. In 1887, Congress established the first independent regulatory agency,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, to correct the monopoly abuses of
the railroads. 17 Three years later, Congress promulgated the Sherman An-
titrust Act to address concentrations of wealth and power across all sectors
of the American economy. In 1914, Congress reinforced this policy by
establishing the Federal Trade Commission.
2. The Great Depression and the New Deal
The second major era of governmental growth did not begin in earnest
until the Great Depression, when again, market failure became the catalyst
16. Royster, 'Regulation' Isn't a Dirty Word, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1987, at 32, col. 2.
17. The statute creating the ICC, the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887, was modeled
on the earlier British Railway Act of 1845. See generally Basedow, Common Carriers -
Continuity and Disintegration in United States Transportation Law - Part One, 13 TRA sp.
L. J. 1 (1983).
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for increased regulation. Regulation of the infrastructure industries-com-
munications, energy, and transportation-proliferated during this period.
Congress created new agencies to regulate business, each modeled on the
original Interstate Commerce Commission. These agencies included the
Federal Power Commission (1930), the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (1934), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), the National
Labor Relations Board (1935), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (1938).
State regulation of interstate commerce enjoyed corresponding growth.
It was during this period that public utility regulation extended to such
industries as airlines, motor carriers, natural gas companies, electric power
production, telecommunications, banking, insurance, securities, and broad-
casting. The stability and growth of these infrastructure industries was
deemed essential to national economic recovery. Accordingly, the govern-
ment regulated, in part, to shield those industries from the impact of
excessive and destructive competition, and thereby provide them with the
stability essential for sustained growth, upon which foundation the growth
of the rest of the economy could begin again.
3. The New Frontier and Great Society: Environmental, and Safety
Regulation
The 1960s saw the third era of proliferation of regulation, when envi-
ronmental, safety, and health regulation expanded in nearly geometric
proportions. Indeed, while there were forty-nine federal agencies in 1960,
by 1976 there were eighty-three agencies. The number of civil servants
employed by regulatory agencies grew from 28,000 in 1970, to 81,000 in
1979.18 By 1985, more than 15 million local, state, and federal employees
administered the regulatory welfare state. 9 Paul MacAvoy estimated that
in 1965, regulated industries produced 8.5 percent of the gross national
product; by 1975, that figure was 23.7 percent. 20
Each of these several forms of regulation was a response to the perceived
inability of the market to satisfy strong public policy imperatives. Thus, at
several points in American history, it has been concluded that only govern-
ment can achieve social objectives which fail to find a high priority in the
marketplace.
E. Rationales for Regulation
Private enterprise dominates the United States economy. Most invest-
ment, production, and consumption decisions are made by private firms
and individuals operating in relatively unregulated markets. 2'
18. S. BRER, REGuLATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982).
19. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY I (2d ed.
1985).
20. S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 1.
21. Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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On those occasions when the market works unsatisfactorily, government
has stepped forward to assist the achievement of policy objectives that the
body politic deemed to be in the public interest. One cluster of such
motivations falls within the ambit of "market failure"-where the market
results in inefficiency and waste in the consumption, use, or allocation of
society's resources. In addressing the circumstances which led America to
reject laissez faire, Professors Jaffe and Nathanson had these salient obser-
vations:
[I]n a number of respects [the political economists] had miscalculated
or had been overoptimistic, and, finally, they had believed that it
was possible (despite the contrary feeling of the mass of humanity)
to reduce certain human values to market values. The political
economists had not reckoned sufficiently with the power of great
owners to manage the markets. They had not dealt adequately with
the tendencies and opportunities of entrepreneurs to control pro-
duction and prices. They exaggerated the fluidity of capital, its
willingness to seek new fields, its ability to leave old ones. They
had envisaged the entrepreneur in terms of the isolated buyer and
seller of a bushel of wheat trading in a vast impersonalized world
market. They had grossly underestimated the inherent and manmade
monopolist powers of banks, coal mines, railroads, great factories
and large ship owners, the concretions of capital and custom which
from their point of view acted like embolisms in the lifeblood of
the system. In shore they had exaggerated the fluidity of the market
and the sensitivity of the productive elements to forces working for
the maximizing of production and the minimizing of price .... [I]n
terms of government and administration [these results] added up
for the legislatures to the proposition that neither the market
mechanism nor business administration could adequately protect the
social organism.22
The government has regulated various sectors of the American economy
for a variety or reasons, not all of which are strictly economic in nature.
Political and social rationales also have been advanced to justify regulation.
But first, let us examine the economic rationales for regulation.
1. Natural Monopolies
Since the passage of the Sherman Act of 1890, monopolies generally
have been disfavored in American law. Antitrust legislation tends to reflect
the normative conclusion that large corporations, bastions of enormous
concentrations of wealth and power, are undesirable. 23
22. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 7-8.
23. Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNATuA Mo-
NOPOLmS 3 (R. Poole, Jr. ed. 1985).
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But a number of industries in our economy are deemed to be natural
monopolies. Here, the economies of scale are so pervasive that a single
firm can offer the product or service most efficiently and economically.
The fixed costs of operation may be so large that duplicative services are
uneconomical. John Stuart Mill was among the first to recognize the
problem, while reviewing the inefficiencies of competing gas and water
systems in London:
It is obvious, for example, how great an economy of labor would
be obtained if London were supplied by a single gas or water
company instead of the existing plurality....
Were there only one establishment, it could make lower charges
consistently with obtaining the rate of profit now realized.
24
By the late nineteenth century, Richard Ely had identified a number of
industries as natural monopolies, including railroads, and express, telegraph,
street-car, gas, and water companies. 25 Henry Carter Adams was the first
to see natural monopolies in terms of economies of scale. Natural monop-
olies have marginal costs which are both lower than their average costs at
the level of quantity demanded, and which decline over a long level of
output. Where the cost per unit of output falls until a single producer can
most efficiently satisfy market demand, competition may not be sustaina-
ble.2
6
The justification for regulating natural monopolies is both cost and
price based. Once a single firm has sunk costs in providing sufficient
capacity for all users, the cost per unit will be lower if that single firm
satisfies all demand. The economies of scale are so significant that the unit
costs of service would increase significantly if more than a single firm
satisfies consumer needs in the region. Hence, a single firm providing the
product or service will consume less of society's resources. For example, if
one pipeline has unused capacity, to allow a competitor to lay a parallel
line would be wasteful. 27 Moreover, economic regulation can ensure that
the cost savings enjoyed as a result of economies of scale can be passed on
to consumers in the form of lower prices.
But because private ownership encourages wealth maximization, a mo-
nopolist will have an incentive to restrict output below and raise prices
24. J. S. MIa, PxuNcT'aas oF PoLncAL EcoNoMY 13 (W.J. Ashley ed. 1926).
25. Ely, The Future of Corporations, HARPERs NEw MONTHLY MAGAzn;E, July 1887, at
260.
26. Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at 9.
27. "[T]otal pipeline construction costs are roughly proportional to the circumference of
the pipe and therefore to its radius, while the volume of gas or oil the pipeline can transmit
is proportional to the pipeline's cross-sectional area and therefore to the square of its radius.
Since the square of the radius increases more rapidly than the radius, it follows that cost per
unit decreases continuously as the pipeline's capacity increases. Indeed, this understates the
economies of large diameter pipe because friction in transmitting oil and gas is also reduced
as capacity grows, and because the amount of right-of-way needed is practically the same
regardless of pipe capacity." Id. at 10.
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above competitive levels. Consumers receiving false price signals respond by
consuming other goods and services, at a higher production cost to society.
Thus, laissez faire can result in a misallocation of resources.
Regulation attempts to avoid a transfer of wealth from consumers to
producers by forcing the natural monopolist to produce at a higher level
of output and at a lower price than he would absent government interven-
tion. Wealth transfers from users to investors tend to be regressive in
character and, therefore, undesirable. Regulation also avoids the problem
of discrimination by the monopolist attempting to increase profits and
suppress competition.
2 9
But these are not the only reasons government constrains the monopolist.
As Professors Stephen Breyer and Richard Stewart noted, "the rationale
for regulation of monopoly power rests not only on economic claims, but
also on other objectives such as fairer income distribution, avoiding dis-
crimination in price or service among customers, and distrust of the social
and political (as well as the economic) power of an unregulated monopo-
list.,' 30
But note that emerging technology has created new competitive oppor-
tunities in those sectors of the economy which traditionally have been
deemed natural monopolies. For example, while the early railroads may
have been natural monopolies, the development of the gasoline engine and
the pneumatic tire made motor carriage a viable competitor for the move-
ment of most industrial products. Similarly, microwave and satellite corn-
munications provide an alternative to the long-line wire of Ma Bell, at least
in long-distance service. Conversely, the new technology of fiber optics,
which has almost infinite capacity for long distance telecommunications,
may have the characteristics of a natural monopoly. If fiber optics does
constitute a natural monopoly, the contemporary investment by AT&T,
Sprint, and MCI in parallel fiber optics lines is wasteful.
Beyond long distance telecommunications, other examples of natural
monopolies include gas and oil pipelines, electricity transmission, and local
distribution utilities such as telephone service, gas, water, electricity, and
cable television.3 Some have insisted that a large amount of fixed and
immovable plant is antoher essential characteristic of a natural monopoly.
However, as we see from the local utility examples, the size and scope of
the natural monopoly need not be large.
2. Externalities
An external effect of a transaction is a positive or negative impact upon
a person not a party to it. Air and water pollution caused by the manufacture
of a commodity is an example of a negative externality, one resulting from
28. S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 19.
29. Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at xiii.
30. S. BREYER & R. STEwAT, supra note 18, at 16.
31. Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at xiii.
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the consumption of the environment as if it were a free good, when it is
in fact a scarce resource. So too are injuries to workers in an unsafe
workplace, or injuries to depositors in failed banking institutions.
Because the maximization of wealth is the primordial economic imper-
ative of the corporate body, it will have compelling incentives to externalize
the full costs of production. These incentives will exist absent the coercive
mechanism of government or fully specified, exclusive, and tradable property
rights. If the firm succeeds, the price of the commodities the body produces
will not reflect the marginal cost to society of the commodity's production.
Purchasers will consume more of the goods whose "spillover" costs are
absent from the purchase price, and, therefore, economic waste will occur.
In his powerful essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin
exposes the incentive to externalize costs:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such
an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries
because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of
both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land.
Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when
the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this
point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates
tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
Explicity or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is
the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This
utility has one negative and one positive component.
(1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the
sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1.
(2) The negative component is a function of the additional over-
grazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects
of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative
utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a
fraction of 1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another. ...
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedoms of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all....
In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in
problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something
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out of the commons, but of putting something in .... The calcu-
lations of utility are much the same as before. The rational man
finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the
commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing
them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system
of 'fouling our own nests,' so long as we behave only as independ-
ent, rational, free-enterprisers.
The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by
private property, or something formally like it. But the air and
waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy
of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different
means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for
the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them un-
treated .
3 2
The Tragedy of the Commons is manifested repeatedly in industrial
production. It is coupled with the Tragedy of the Good Samaratin. Imagine
two manufacturers producing widgets-one a ruthless, greedy, exploitive
capitalist (call him Snldley Whiplash of "The Rocky & Bullwinkle Show"
fame), and the other a moral, righteous, compassionate good samaratin
(call him Farnsworth of "Heaven Can Wait" fame). Assume that widgets
are essentially fungible products; a consumer would not prefer Whiplash's
widgets to Farnsworth's, or vice versa, unless one was offered at a better
price. Assume also that unless expensive pollution control devices are
installed, the production of widgets creates carcinogenic air and water
pollution. Further assume that both Farnsworth and Whiplash produce
widgets at the same marginal cost of production ( e.g., wages, raw materials,
and transportation costs are identical). They both sell their widgets in the
market at the same price.
Farnsworth decides that he cannot sleep at night knowing that his
production of widgets may create cancers in the downstream and downwind
populations. He therefore invests in pollution abatement equipment, passing
along the costs thereof as a few cents more in the purchase price of his
widgets. Whiplash has no conscience at all, or at least prefers the wealth
he can realize from increased sales to the emotional benefit to be realized
from a clear conscience, and chooses not to invest in pollution abatement
equipment. A few environmentally conscious consumers, knowing of the
good work Farnsworth is doing to clean the environment, buy the Farn-
sworth widget. But the overwhelming number of consumers buy the product
sold at the lowest price, and because the Whiplash widget is priced lower,
Whiplash soon dominates the market. Before long, Farnsworth is out of
business, the victim of the Tragedy of the Good Samaratin. Moreover,
society's resources have been misallocated, for the Whiplash widget does
not reflect its true costs of production, because its sale price fails to include
32. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCMNCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
1989l
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
the external costs of pollution, and the health care, pain, and suffering
created by increased cancers.
Ronald Coase theorized that, assuming the absence of transaction costs
and freely exchangeable private property rights, those with wealth, suffering
the impact of the negative externality could bargain with those producing
it, and reach a mutually agreeable price. 3 For example, home owners
suffering the ill-effects of air pollution produced by Whiplash's nearby
factory could band together and "bribe" him to abstain, or he could
"bribe" them to accept poorer air quality. While an attractive conceptual
theory, the problem remains that bargaining is not costless. Even if our
home owners collectively had sufficient resources to fund the "bribe", and
even if they could band together easily, some might refuse to contribute to
it, becoming in essence "free riders," enjoying better quality air without
paying the price. 34 Government regulation can significantly reduce transac-
tion costs, and eliminate the "free rider" problem.
As we shall see below, the judiciary offers a forum to force producers
to internalize the costs of production, including the cost of injury to third
parties. However, evidentiary problems, transaction costs, and the inability
of the available remedies to restore health or life may make the judicial
solutions inferior to prophylactic regulation. Moreover, the overall costs to
society of health care may far outweigh the cost for pollution abatement
or enhanced safety.
Note how the regulatory mechanism can alleviate the inequitable dis-
parity between the price of Whiplash's and Farnsworth's widgets, and
enhance allocative efficiency. By forcing them both to clean their emissions,
the price of their products rises to reflect the cost to society of avoiding
the negative externalities of harmful pollution, and neither producer has an
artificial advantage in the market. If one producer can develop more
efficient and less expensive pollution abatement technology, the producer
may have a deserved advantage in the sale of his product. Moreover, forcing
the internalization of pollution costs sends consumers correct price signals
that reflect fully the cost to society of producing widgets. Consumers might
then choose to purchase something other than widgets, which costs society
less to produce, rather than continuing their profligate consumption of
widgets.
Many commodities sold in the market do not reflect the full cost to
society or even the costs imposed upon parties to the transaction. This leads
to overconsumption. Alcohol, tobacco, and firearms are prime examples,
whose manufacturers escape the cost of health and life their products take.35
Our legal system assumes free will, and absolves these manufacturers from
liability. But for a moment assume a different legal regime. This regime
33. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
34. A good example of free riders are those who enjoy public television or radio without
contributing to it. In Denver, only fifteen percent of public radio's listeners contribute to it.
35. I know, I know, guns don't kill people; people kill people.
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requires that tobacco companies fund cancer hospitals and mortuaries, that
liquor manufacturers fund automobile insurance and mortuaries, and that
gun manufacturers fund hospital emergency wards and mortuaries. Un-
doubtedly, this would have an inflationary impact on the price of alcohol,
tobacco, and firearms. But the price would better reflect the costs incurred
by society through the consumption of these products, and actually dis-
courage marginal consumption.
Regulation also can encourage positive externalities. By insisting on a
high level of service at a nondiscriminatory price, regulatory agencies can
ensure that small towns and rural communities enjoy reasonable access to
the transportation, communication, and energy networks. Without access,
small town and rural community producers cannot compete in the broader
market for the sale of goods and services. 6
3. Protection of the Infrastructure Industries From Destructive
Competition
During the economic collapse of the 1930s, faith in market forces fell
to an unprecedented low. In the public debate as to whether the infrastruc-
ture industries (i.e., transportation, communications, and energy) should be
regulated, terms such as competition were saddled with pejorative adjectives,
like "excessive," "wasteful," "destructive," "uneconomic," "unfair," and
"ruinous. '37 For example, the high failure rate in industries like motor
carriage and airlines was deemed injurious to the prospects for national
economic recovery. Therefore, these industries were shielded from the
deleterious effects of excessive competition by entry and rate regulation."
The argument for economic regulation stems, in part, from the obser-
vation that the infrastructure industries provide an instantly perishable
product which cannot be stored or warehoused. Hence, when capacity is
excessive, the vicissitudes of the market cycle are particularly brutal for
such industries. Producers might be able to cover only the marginal costs
of production. Without a contribution to fixed costs over the long term, as
the physical plant wears out, the producer will go out of business.39
Excess capacity can create a downward pricing spiral which will render
many marginal firms bankrupt. In industries where the public will need the
capacity when the slope of the demand curve turns upward, such as railroads
and ocean shipping, a political determination has been made that the
government shall shield these industries from the full effects of competition.
This shielding assures the public adequate capacity to satisfy maximum
36. See Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities, 39
AOII. L. REV. 445 (1987).
37. See Dempsey, The Rise & Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board - Opening Wide the
Floodgates of Entry, 11 TsANsP. L. J. 91, 91-108 (1979).
38. See generally P. DEMPsEY & W. THOMS, LAW & EcoNobIc REGULATION IN TRANs-
PORTATION 19-21, 26-29 (1986).
39. D. Locian, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 138 (6th ed. 1966).
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demand, without drastic swings in price. A healthy infrastructure, again, is
the foundation upon which the rest of commerce is built. Thus, a number
of key industries have been the subject of promotional favor by the federal
government. As Richard Posner has noted:
The regulated industries are part of the 'infrastructure' of economic
growth. Adequate transportation, communications, and power (es-
pecially electrical) must be in place before the development of
modern industry is possible, and most countries, including this one
at various periods, have undertaken to subsidize these services or
provide them directly in the hope thereby of attracting industrial
developers. 40
Some economists have observed that destructive competition can have
several undesirable effects. These effects include long periods of inadequate
investment and slow technological progress which would lead to poor service
and periodic shortages. It might also lead to widespread bankruptcies of
small firms, and ultimately, a highly concentrated industry structure. Large
firms might engage in predatory practices against their smaller rivals, thus
exacerbating the concentration problem.
41
Some argue that a healthy infrastructure is essential not only for robust
economic growth, but to satisfy the needs of the national defense. Hence,
the congressional statements of policy in transportation and communications
legislation often have included an explicit reference to the utility of the
industries in enhancing the national defense.
In some instances, both labor and business may line up on the side of
regulation and against "excessive" competition. Labor seeks to protect
wages, while business seeks to protect investment. In these instances, it is
argued that the economic and social costs of unconstrained market forces
are simply too painful to bear.
4. Allocation of Scarce Resources
Some national resources are deemed owned by the public. Because the
nature of these resources dictates that they can be utilized by only a single
user, government selects which among several applicants will be granted the
exclusive franchise. Examples include distribution of television and radio
frequencies. Entry regulation is imposed so that multiple users do not create
broadcast interference, thereby jamming each other's signals. Similar policies
govern the decision of where a hydroelectric dam shall be constructed, and
by whom, and the question of who shall be granted permission to lease or
exploit the natural resources on federal land.
Unconstrained individual use of a scarce common resource also may
result in waste. Thus, several property owners' uncontrolled extraction of
40. Posner, Taxation By Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sm. 22, 39 (1971).
41. Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at 13.
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oil from a petroleum reservoir may deplete the pool so that maximum
efficiency can never be achieved, leaving some of the oil unrecoverable.
Many oil producing states have enacted conservation statutes which regulate
spacing of wells and rates of extraction to maximize the long-term produc-
tivity of the field.
5. Furtherance of Other Social Policies
(a) Paternalism: Protecting the Public From Erroneous Decisionmaking
Several additional reasons beyond allocative efficiency have been ad-
vanced for the use of regulation to accomplish social goals. Usually, these
forms of regulation are justified on grounds of protecting the "public
interest." In essence, this public interest regulation results in government's
paternalistic protection of the citizens who lack sufficient information to
perceive risk and make a rational choice. It also shields citizens from
erroneous decisionmaking, or protects citizens from negative externalities
before they occur.
The costs of acquiring information can be large, and any one consumer
may be unable to obtain sufficient information at a reasonable cost.
Government regulation can reduce these transaction costs by forcing prod-
ucers to provide accurate information regarding the products they produce,
licensing certain industries, providing oversight to ensure that industries
meet minimum standards, or outright prohibition. Examples of such pre-
injury protection include health and safety regulation (of food and drugs,
and means of transport, for example), and the licensing of industries and
professions (such as banks, insurance companies, doctors, and lawyers).
The philosophy of P.T. ("there's a sucker born every minute") Barnum
rested on a premise of ruthless human greed that compels producers to
deceive consumers as to the quality or characteristics of the products they
are selling. Regulation over "unfair and deceptive competitive practices" is
designed to keep the market honest, so that a rational consumer can make
informed judgments as to how to spend his wealth.
The free market will provide the goods and services that individual
consumers (who have money) want most. But if broader societal objectives
should be promoted irrespective of satiating consumer tastes, the market
will be an imperfect means of promoting them. As Nobel laureate George
Stigler has noted, "When the society forbids children to be chimney sweeps
or forbids the public sale of heroin, it is not countering market failure but
seeking to thwart the market's fulfillment of undesirable desires." '42
(b) Distribution of Wealth
Another social policy which regulation sometimes advances is the redis-
tribution of wealth and power between regulated industries and their cus-
42. Stigler, The Economists' Traditional Theory of the Economic Functions of the State,
in THE CrizN AND THE Sr TE 103, 110 (1975).
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tomers, and between classes of customers. The unregulated market, in
contrast, tends to favor those with more wealth, because they have more
votes of dollar approval to cast in the market than those without.
The government established several regulatory agencies to provide some
measure of balance between the needs of consumers and the needs of the
regulated enterprise. For example, a railroad cannot unilaterally abandon
rail service to a community. The railroad must wait until those members
of the shipping public who the move will adversely affect have an oppor-
tunity to express their objections to a governmental body, the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Regulatory agencies sometimes insist that industries
use their supracompetitive profits from lucrative markets to cross-subsidize
losses in less remunerative markets. Consequently, regulation can redistrib-
ute wealth without utilizing the taxing and spending mechanism.
Examples of the government's redistribution of wealth through regula-
tion are abundant. Before 1970, rail freight profits cross-subsidized rail
passenger service. Prior to 1978, airline ticket prices in major markets cross-
subsidized small community service. 43 Before the break-up of AT&T, profits
from long distance cross-subsidized losses in local and residential service.
Posner notes that
an important purpose in fact of public utility and common carrier
regulation is to compel, by the device of the internal subsidy, the
provision of certain services in quantities and at prices that a free
market would not offer, much as the conventional taxing-spending
power is used to the same end.44
Regulation also strengthens the position of those without equality of
bargaining power, and thereby protects the competitive process against
distortions based on wealth and power. Individuals and small businesses
are more subject to pricing discrimination than large businesses. Individuals
and small businesses, therefore, have employed the regulatory mechanism
as a shield against such discrimination. Because such services as telecom-
munications and transportation, and such products as electricity and natural
gas cannot easily be resold to other purchasers, a producer can maximize
wealth by raising prices to those least likely to leave the system, and
lowering prices to prevent abandonment by those who have a reasonably
priced competitive alternative.45 Pricing discrimination can increase unduly
the producer's profits and have a deleterious effect upon competition. 46
Most traditional forms of regulation prohibit such discrimination.
Another form of wealth distribution that both regulation and taxation
encourage is the elimination of "windfall profits." Thus, if a producer of
43. Dempsey, supra note 35, at 454-59.
44. Posner, supra note 39, at 41. Nevertheless, Posner objects to such a policy on
grounds that it tends to be arbitrary and inequitable, and distorts the efficient allocation of
resources. Id. at 41-43.
45. S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 17.
46. Study on Regulation, supra note 4, at xvi.
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products particularly important to consumers is suddenly able, through no
creative enterprise of his own, to raise prices, a regressive transfer of wealth
from consumers to producers occurs. Because the producer has done nothing
to increase the value of his product, the profits are unearned. Government
intervenes to ensure that the "windfall" rents benefit the consumer rather
than the producer. 47 Thus, after the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, the
government imposed oil price regulations upon the petroleum industry.
During both World War II and the Nixon Administration, the government
administered price controls to reduce inflation.
6. Legal Rationales for Expansion of Federal Regulation
(a) Judicial Emasculation of State Regulation
On a number of occasions judicial decisions have been the catalyst for
expansion of federal economic regulation. In transportation, the states were
the first to regulate the railroads. The 1886 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Wabash v. Illinois,48 however, limited the states' jurisdiction over
intrastate commerce. The Supreme Court interpreted article 1, section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution as precluding states' regulation of interstate rail
activities. Because most of the freight moved in interstate commerce, Con-
gress filled the regulatory void the following year by establishing federal
regulation over the industry and creating the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to administer the regulations.
In 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a similar decision in
Buck v. Kuykendahl. 49 In Buck, the Supreme Court limited the states'
jurisdiction over interstate motor carriers. Less than a decade later, Congress
gave the ICC jurisdiction over interstate motor carriers. 50 Similarly, in 1927,
in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.,5 the
Supreme Court struck down state regulation of interstate electric rates.
Largely to fill the gap the Attleboro decision created, Congress established
the Federal Power Commission in 1930.
(b) Administrative Efficiency: The "Tar Baby Effect"
Sometimes it becomes impossible to regulate one aspect of an industry
without regulating all facets of the industry. Once again, let us look at
transportation. In 1887, Congress vested the ICC with jurisdiction over rail
rates. By 1920, it was apparent that for the ICC to regulate the industry
effectively the ICC would need authority over rail entry and abandonments.
Accordingly, Congress so expanded the agency's jurisdiction. By 1935, motor
47. S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 22.
48. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
49. 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
50. See P. DEMPsEY & W. THoMs, supra note 37, at 10-21.
51. Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 173 U.S. 83 (1927).
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carriers had become a viable alternative mode for the movement of freight.
Again, Congress extended the ICC's jurisdiction to cover motor carriers.
Equality of treatment became a policy objective of some importance. Either
both railroads and motor carriers should be unregulated, or both should be
regulated. Congress, fearing that the superior market position of the rail-
roads would curtail the growth of the infant trucking industry, chose
regulation.
In 1938, with the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Congress
committed the burgeoning airline industry to economic regulation. In the
1940s, freight forwarders and inland water carriers were placed under the
ICC's regulatory umbrella. Similarly, the Federal Communications Com-
mission extended its jurisdiction to cable television services more effectively
to regulate broadcasting.
Hence, it can be difficult to regulate one aspect of an industry without
regulating them all. Professor Thomas Morgan describes this phenomenon
as the "tar baby effect." 5 2 Comprehensive regulation becomes the ultimate
result of the inability of government to extricate itself once it has become
immersed in regulating significant aspects of an industry's operations.
F. Regulatory Failure and Deregulation
Paradoxically, just as economic regulation was born of market failure,
the contemporary wave of deregulation was born of regulatory failure. After
the dust settled from the Great Society, there was a widely held perception
that government was inefficient, costly, and ineffective. Much of the mo-
mentum for deregulation was born of the exasperation of businesses and
individuals over what was perceived to be an unwieldy and expensive
Washington bureaucracy that tied them in red tape. 3 People viewed the
direct and indirect costs of regulation as expensive and inflationary. The
direct costs were felt in the tax dollars directly needed to support the
agencies and their large staffs. But the indirect costs were also large-the
armies of lawyers, lobbyists, accountants, and expert witnesses needed to
satiate the agencies' enormous appetite for paper and endless hearings.
"Regulatory lag" was costly not only in terms of the impact of market
inflation upon obsolete pricing, but also made business decisionmaking
difficult, for the regulatory future was uncertain and unpredictable.
Economist Robert DeFina predicted that for each dollar spent by
government directly to regulate, industry suffered an economic burden for
compliance of twenty times as much. Under this hypothesis, taxpayers spent
$3 billion in 1976 to run the regulatory agencies, while industry presumably
spent an additional $60 billion to comply with the regulations the agencies
52. T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON, & P. VERKU]L, ECONOMIc REGULATION OF BUSINESS 22
(2d ed. 1985).
53. Dempsey, Erosion of the Regulatory Process - The Winds of Change, 47 I.C.C.
PRAc. J. 303, 319 (1980).
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imposed. 4 Regulatory agencies are often headed by individuals who are
products of a system of political patronage. Furthermore, like academic
institutions, regulatory agencies are staffed by individuals with excessive job
security. Neither of these factors are conducive to productivity or effi-
ciency.55
Professor Bernard Schwartz noted this political patronage and excessive
job security as one of the two major causes of contemporary disillusionment
with administrative agencies. Schwartz stated:
The goal of cheap and inexpensive justice by experts, one of the
chief reasons for setting up agencies, has proven illusory. The
administrative process has too often proved even more expensive
and time-consuming than the judicial process. Even more important
has been the increasing failure of agencies to protect the very public
interest they were created to serve. The administrative process, which
had once been vigorous in fighting for the public interest, has
become an established part of the economic status quo. It has come
to terms with those it is ostensibly regulating; the "public interest"
is equated more and more with the interest of those being regu-
lated .5
6
Professor William Jones gave as an example the inability (or unwillingness)
of regulatory agencies to protect the public against monopoly abuses. Jones
said, "In most multi-firm regulated industries ... the principal focus of
price regulation is not on protecting consumers from monopolistic exploi-
tation, but on protecting rivals from vigorous pricing competition. ' 57 Thus,
over time many agencies have lost sight of their responsibility to protect
the "public" or consumer interest. Instead, these agencies have embraced
the policy of facilitating the optimal economic interests of the industry they
regulate.
According to George Stigler, regulatory agencies became subject to
"capture." The agencies fell prey to the interests of the industries they
regulated. The regulators began to protect the regulated industries from
competitive market forces, instead of achieving their original social objec-
tives.
The direct and indirect costs of regulation were inflationary, and created
distortions in the marketplace which resulted in a misallocation of society's
54. Deregulation - A Fast Start for the Reagan Strategy, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1981, at
62, 66.
55. Like civil service protection of government employees, tenure of college professors
seems to have a debilitating effect upon all but the self-motivated. Post-tenure, too many of
our colleagues crawl into a fetal position in semi-retirement, making little contribution to legal
education beyond the classroom. See Swygert & Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication
Study: Comparisons of Law School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 373 (1985).
56. B. ScawARTz, AmRsnaSTATrE LAW (2d ed. 1984).
57. Jones, Government Price Controls and Inflation: A Prognosis Based on the Impact
of Controls In the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L. Rv. 303, 323 (1980).
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resources. The distortions were perverse. In transportation, regulation cre-
ated excessive service and insufficient pricing competition (vis-h-vis that
which might have existed in the absence of regulation). Railroads earned
an inadequate return on investment, leading to several carrier failures during
the 1970s (Penn Central, Milwaukee, and Rock Island "mighty fine" Line
principal among them)." In natural gas, regulation imposed low prices, but
created massive shortages. In telecommunications, regulation underpriced
local service, but overpriced long distance. 9
As a consequence, there began in the 1970s a strong bipartisan political
movement to free industry from the shackles of regulation. The blind
antagonism against government inspired a barrage of deregulatory initiatives.
The major deregulatory efforts of the contemporary era have included the
following:
1968-U.S. Supreme Court allows non-AT&T equipment to be
hooked up to Bell system
1969-Federal courts allow MCI long distance access to residential
telephones
1970-Interest rates on deposits of more than $100,000 deregulated
1972-FCC adopts open skies satellite policy
1975-SEC abolished fixed brokerage fees; ICC prohibits rate bu-
reau protests for independent rate filings
1976-Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
1977-Air Cargo Deregulation Act
1978-Airline Deregulation Act; Natural Gas Policy Act; OSHA
revokes 928 rules
1979-FCC deregulation of earth satellite stations
1980-Motor Carrier Act; Staggers Rail Act; Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act; International Air Trans-
portation Competition Act; Household Goods Transportation Act;
FCC deregulation of cable television
1981-Executive Order decontrol of crude oil and refined petroleum
prices; FCC deregulation of non-entertainment programming for
radio
1982-Bus Regulatory Refort Act; Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institution Act; Modified Final Judgment in U.S. v. AT&T
1984-The Shipping Act; Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act; Cable
Communications Policy Act; FCC deregulates non-entertainment
TV programming
1986-Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act
1987-FCC abolishes Fairness Doctrine
Congress' legislative initiatives have been coupled with the Presidential
appointment of a large number of free market economists and deregulation
58. For criticism of railroad regulation and praise of deregulation, see Wilner, Railroads
and the Marketplace, 16 T"aNsP. L.J. 291 (1988).
59. See S. BRaYER, supra note 17.
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ideologues to the federal agencies. 60 The result has been the most radical
and comprehensive change in government policy since the New Deal. Not
surprisingly, this change has been profoundly in the opposite direction.
G. Public Choice Theory
Proponents of the public choice theory embrace the normative conclu-
sion that we would be better off with less regulation and less government.
Because politicians respond to pressure groups and the desire to be reelected,
politicians often employ the wheels of government to magnify rather than
eliminate market imperfections. Blending schools of market economics and
political science, public choice theorists adhere to a policy hostile to gov-
ernment and friendly to *unconstrained competition.
Public choice theory was the prevailing wisdom in the Reagan Admin-
istration. Consistent with public choice theory, Interior Secretary James
Watt and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Ann Gorsuch
reduced enforcement of environmental regulation. It was the theory under
which Federal Trade Commission Chairman James Miller III gutted the
agency's antitrust regulatory staff. Pursuant to public choice theory Federal
Communications Commission Chairman Mark Fowler repealed radio and
TV programming and advertising regulations.61 It was the theory under
which ICC Chairman Heather Gradison refused to regulate rail rates in
monopoly markets. 62 Adhering to the tenets of public choice theory the
Department of Transportation under Secretary Elizabeth Dole approved
every airline merger proposal submitted to the agency. 63
V. A COST/BENEFiT ANALYsIs
A. Benefits of Deregulation
Only the market can create the combination of price and service options
that consumer demand dictates. The law of supply and demand eliminates
shortages. In a competitive industry, if a good or service is earning its
producer excessive profits, new competitors are attracted to the market like
sharks to the smell of blood. Thus, under the "theory of contestable
markets," new entry, or its threat, constrains the exertion of market power
for any appreciable length of time, at least where the barriers to entry are
60. See Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission: Disintegration of An American
Legal Institution, 34 Am. U. L. REv. 1 (1984). Former ICC Chairman Joseph Eastman argued
that "[Z]ealots, evangelists, and crusaders have their value before an administrative tribunal,
but not on it." Eastman, Twelve Point Primer, 16 TR.sSp. L.J. 175, 177 (1987) [emphasis in
original]. He was right.
61. See Broadcast Deregulation: The Reagan Years and Beyond, 40 ADmN. L. Rv. 345
(1988).
62. See Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation: Monopoly I$ the Name
of the Game, 21 GA. L. R1v. 505, 577-88 (1987).
63. Id. at 510-47.
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low . 4 In a competitive market, prices are set at marginal costs. Inefficient
competitors are driven out of the market by their lower-cost rivals. Ulti-
mately, the most efficient producers survive.
Deregulation has tended to make the deregulated industries more com-
petitive, particularly as to price. Inefficient and smaller enterprises have
been driven into bankruptcy. The disciplines of social Darwinism have
forced existing enterprises to become more efficient, curtail costs, and
improve productivity. The Darwinistic disciplines have inspired technological
development in many industries. The squeeze on profits engendered by
competition has encouraged technological and managerial innovations, and
thereby higher levels of productivity. Productivity increases result in ex-
panded economic wealth and, hence, higher living standards.
America's capitalist system has produced a cornucopia of goods and
services for the common man. It does this by tapping man's innate greed,
and rewarding those who satisfy the wants of the masses. While the capitalist
system has been less than perfect at achieving equality of wealth distribution,
it has worked well in expanding the overall size of the economic pie. The
prevailing wisdom in the contemporary political environment is that the
unconstrained market is a superior mechanism to government regulation for
the distribution of the earth's scarce resources among consumers. In no
small sense, the Reagan Administration's approach transcended the notion
that efficiency in the allocation of resources is the optimum social objective,
for it embraces deregulation even where competition is imperfect (e.g.,
unconstrained rail monopoly pricing, dilution of antitrust standards). De-
regulation has become an end in itself, not a means to the end of enhanced
competition.
B. The Costs of Deregulation
While deregulation has had significant benefits, it has not been without
its costs. The free market only satisfies man's interest in economic efficiency,
and it sometimes fails to do that. The free market also fails to satisfy
society's social needs which do not find a high priority in the marketplace.
Although deregulation offers the economy significant benefits in facil-
itating achievement of allocative efficiency, the empirical results of the
experiment reveal that, nevertheless, major costs have been incurred. For
example, while the Fortune 500 companies tend to enjoy relatively lower
transportation and communication rates, small businesses do not.65 Although
large communities seem to enjoy enhanced competition in transportation
and communications, small communities pay higher prices for decidedly
poorer service. 66 Thus, the benefits of deregulation have been unevenly
64. See W. BAumOL, J. PAz.Ap & R. Wm.ma, CoNTESTABLE MARKEs AND = TEoRY
O1 INDUSTRY STRUcTURE (1982).
65. See Dempsey, The Empirical Results of Deregulation: A Decade Later, and the Band
Played On, 17 T.ANsp. L.J. 31 (1988).
66. See Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities, 39
ADmaN. L. REv. 445 (1987).
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distributed. With the elimination of the cross-subsidies that regulation
mandated, there are winners and losers under deregulation. And while the
downward squeeze on profits engendered by enhanced competition has
forced many deregulated companies to become more efficient, labor-man-
agement relations have deteriorated.
In a nutshell, these are some of the major costs which have been
incurred in deregulating the following industries:
Airlines
Service deterioration
Erosion of the margin of safety
High number of failures (more than 150 bankruptcies)
Industry concentration (8 airlines have 94% of the passenger market)
Consumer abuses (misleading advertising, deliberate overbooking,
unrealistic scheduling)
Deterioration of labor/management relations
Banking
Service deterioration
High number of failures
Federal insurance companies nearing bankruptcy
Buses
4,500 small communities abandoned
Industry duopoly becomes monopoly with merger of Greyhound
and Trailways
Deterioration of labor/management relations
Railroads
Industry concentration (7 railroads account for more than 86% of
freight and 93% of profits)
Monopoly rents extracted from grain and coal shippers
Telecommunications
Deterioration of service
Concentration in long-distance (AT&T has 82% market share)
Local and residential rate increases outpace declining toll rates (local
rates have increased between 38-52% since divestiture)
Trucking
Deterioration of safety
High number of failures
Concentration in the less-than-truckload [LTL] sector of the industry
(with the top 10 firms responsible for 60% of freight and 90% of
profits)
Deterioration of labor/management relations
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C. Externalities
Free market theorists argue that the market provides an optimum and
efficient allocation of the world's scarce resources. It is a cold theory devoid
of morality. Thus, if men believe that the horn of a rhinoceros contains an
aphrodisiac, they will hunt the beasts to extinction to obtain that scarce
resource. If the soft fur of a baby seal fetches a good price in the market,
trappers will club the seals unconscious, and strip them of their fur, leaving
them to freeze to death in the cold arctic winds. Only regulation, backed
by the coercive enforcement mechanism of the state, will save the rhino
from extinction, and the baby seal from an agonizing death. Only govern-
ment can protect the rich history of archaeological sites from pillage by
looters.
The primordial imperative of economic man is the accumulation of
wealth. To the extent that he can shed himself of the costs of production
by externalizing them, he will gladly do so. He will spew his toxic waste
into the "commons" of our streams and atmosphere. As we shall see, the
judiciary is a poor mechanism for resolving such injuries, for the chain of
causation is difficult to prove. For example, if one suffers the ill effects of
"acid rain," how does one identify the culprit(s)?
Not since the passing of the great dinosaurs some sixty-five million
years ago have so many species of life on this planet met their fate in
extinction, as man, pursuing the imperatives of the free market, hunts them
down, clears their forests, and pollutes their habitats. This is a rational
man pursuing wealth, distributing the world's scarce resources among homo
sapien consumers. Because other species of life have no dollars, they get
no vote in the human economic system. Other earthlings, thus, become
consumables in an inhumane system which places little value on the pres-
ervation of the genetic codes of exotic forms of life.
The externalities of unregulated industrial production are also producing
global environmental hazards. Consumption of fossil fuels has released
massive volumes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, creating a green-
house effect. Some scientists predict that, if present trends continue, the
mean temperature of the planet will rise between 2.5 and 7.5 degrees
Fahrenheit by the middle of the next century. That would make the earth
warmer than it has been in 100,000 years. It would thaw water locked in
the polar ice caps, raising sea level by fifteen to twenty feet, enough to
flood many cities. 67
Chlorofluorocarbons are used as a refrigerant and, in most nations, as
an aerosol propellant. Their release into the atmosphere contributes to the
greenhouse effect, and also destroys ozone, which protects the earth's
inhabitants from the sun's ultraviolet rays. A sharp increase in ultraviolet
exposure would cause increased melanomas and other malignant skin can-
cers, and reduce agricultural yield. In recent years, melanomas have doubled
67. A Global Greenhouse, NAT'L GEoGRAPinc, April 1987, at 514-15.
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worldwide. 68 The forests of Europe are being destroyed by "acid rain," a
phenomenon common to all nations downwind of the burning of high sulfur
coal. 69 As Garrett Hardin noted, only the government's coercive mechanisms
of taxation or regulation can force producers to internalize the environmental
spillovers of production.
D. Paternalism: The Prophylactic of Injury
I use the term paternalism to mean little more than a prescriptive
solution to the problem of externalities. To the extent that potential negative
externalities are perceived to exist, government may regulate in a manner
which protects those who might be injured before they suffer injury.
Although the courts were created to provide economic compensation after
an injury has been sustained, thus making the injured party "whole," there
are instances where economic compensation, no matter how generous, is
not enough. Wealth, for all the pleasure it may command, cannot resurrect
life, and too often, cannot restore health.
Market theory rests on the foundation that men will behave rationally.
If survival is a rational behavioral characteristic of mammals, then conduct
which jeopardizes survival is irrational. If men behaved rationally, the
tobacco industry would be bankrupt. The unregulated market encourages
hedonistic satisfaction of human desires. Government can attempt to regulate
the market to achieve paternalistic objectives that are deemed socially best
for its citizens, but if the market imperatives are sufficiently strong, men
will avoid the regulatory impediments. Thus, illicit drugs are consumed in
vast quantities, despite government's efforts to regulate their consumption,
because the market so strongly satiates man's thirst for pleasure. Would a
rational man submit his body to drug addiction? But pimps and drug dealers
are some of the more unsavory products of too free a market. Other
examples of government's protection of its citizens by promulgating regu-
lations designed to shield them from injury include the following:
-During the first four years of federal safety packing require-
ments, ingestion of poisons by children dropped by forty percent.
Child resistant bottle caps reduced the number of poisonings treated
by hospital emergency rooms by 230,000 between 1973 and 1979.
-Since safety standards for cribs were promulgated in 1974,
crib strangulations have fallen by fifty percent.
-Prior to the promulgation of children's sleepwear regulations,
thirty-four percent of flame-bum injuries involved sleepwear; today,
the figure is nearly zero.
-The benefit of eliminating dangerous drugs from the market,
e.g, Thalidomide and Panalbas, has been estimated to be $300
million annually.
68. Air, An Atmosphere of Uncertainty, NAT'L GEoaaRAHic, April 1987, at 502, 518.
69. Id. at 530.
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-Between 1966 and 1981 federal automobile safety regulations
saved approximately 100,000 lives, and averted millions of injuries.
-Federal clean air standards for sulphur dioxide and suspended
particulates are projected to reduce the mortality rate by seven
percent, saving 125,000 lives per year.
70
Of course, such benefits are not without their costs. For example, many
important and useful drugs are available in Europe years before they are
sold in the United States. Accordingly, many Americans are deprived of
the benefits of these drugs while the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
performs its tests. Of course, that means that Europeans serve as America's
guinea pigs. If vast European populations should suddenly die, we would
know not to introduce that drug into our nation.
E. Distribution of Wealth
Professor/jurist Richard Posner admits that market "economics yields
no answer to the question whether the existing distribution of income and
wealth is good or bad, just or unjust ... neither does it yield an answer
to the ultimate question whether an efficient allocation of resources would
be good, just, or otherwise socially or ethically desirable. Nor can the
economist tell us whether, assuming the existing distribution of income and
wealth is just, consumer satisfaction should be the dominant value of
society.'"71
1. Transportation
In fact, much of economic regulation initially was premised on the
achievement of an allocation of goods and services more just than the
market allocation. For example, one of the principal rationales for economic
regulation of transportation was to eliminate carrier discrimination in levels
of price and service based upon the size or location of the shipper. In part,
this was a response to John D. Rockefeller's competitive advantages in
shipping his oil to market via railroad, advantages attributable to size and
market power over his smaller competitors. 72 Congress deemed itself ill-
equipped to deal with the complex problems posed by the rail monopolies,
and created the Interstate Commerce Commission, giving the ICC jurisdic-
tion to devise a solution.73
The ICC enforced statutory prohibitions against discrimination between
shippers. This allowed the small shipper to enjoy essentially the same rates
70. See Green, Cost of NOT Regulating, WASHmINrON PosT, Nov. 24, 1981, at A17,
col. 4; Lee, The Good Regulations, N.Y. Tns, Jan 31, 1979, at A22, Col. 3.
71. See Posner, supra note 39.
72. Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On a Collision Course?, 13 TRasp. L.J.
329 (1984).
73. Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis
and Evolution of this Endangered Species, 32 Am. U. L. Rav. 335, 336 (1983).
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for equivalent shipments as the large shipper. The ICC also ensured that
common carriers served small and remote shippers on a nondiscriminatory
basis by holding them to a "common carrier obligation"-a responsibility
to serve all shippers within the perimeters of their operating certificates. 74
If carriers were not earning sufficient returns on less attractive markets, the
ICC forced them to cross-subsidize these losses with profits earned on more
highly remunerative markets. Through "rate averaging," the regulation of
telecommunications and electric utilities has embraced essentially the same
principle.
Economic regulation imposed both a benefit and a burden upon regu-
lated enterprises. The burden was the common carrier obligation to serve
all geographic regions in their operating certificates in a nondiscriminatory
fashion. Ceilings were imposed on rates to prohibit carriers from taking
advantage of situations in which they held market power. The benefit to
carriers was freedom from destructive levels of competition; entry into the
industry was regulated. One of the results of this system was a transfer of
wealth, from urban shippers to rural shippers, from large shippers to small
shippers, and from rail freight traffic to rail passenger service.
Deregulation has largely eliminated those cross-subsidies. Today, large
shippers enjoy a significantly lower price for transportation services than
do small shippers. Urban areas have advantages in terms of lower prices
and higher levels of service than do rural areas. For example, since prom-
ulgation of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, more than 4,500
communities have lost intercity bus service, while only 896 have gained it.
75
The winners under deregulation are the large shippers and large communities;
the losers are small businessmen and rural America.
2. Communications
Regulation frequently was imposed to accomplish social objectives un-
related to economic efficiency. For example, one of the major objectives
of the Communications Act of 1934 was the promotion of universal service.
7 6
Universal service meant that every village and hamlet in the country would
have reasonably priced telephone service. It was believed that every home
should have access to this important communications system.
As technology improved, the cost of providing long distance telecom-
munications fell, while inflation drove up the cost of providing local service.
Yet, to keep local and residential rates down, regulators refused to allow
telephone companies to raise them, forcing the companies to make up the
difference by internally cross-subsidizing the revenue shortfall with growing
Q
74. Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion-Never the Twain Shall Meet:
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 CHi.-KiNT L. REv. 1 (1982).
75. Dempsey, supra note 35, at 460-62.
76. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-661 (1982).
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profits in the long distance field. 77 In effect, this was the route of least
political friction. The result was some wealth redistribution, away from
businesses and higher income groups, whose members place a larger number
of toll calls, in favor of users of basic local service.
When the AT&T monopoly was broken up, the cross-subsidy totaled
some $7 billion annually. Because AT&T has suffered the diaspora of
divestiture, and because the evolving technology allows bypass of local
telephone service, further deregulation is inevitable. The inevitable conse-
quence of further deregulation will be elimination of the cross-subsidy. In
Colorado, for example, this will mean that the basic local telephone rate
must be increased from its present $9 to $10 per month, to approximately
$21 per month if it is to cover incremental costs, $32 per month if it is to
cover fully allocated costs, and whatever the market will bear if the
monopoly is deregulated. 78 Local residents will have no option but to pay
the higher costs or terminate their service because, under existing technology,
it is a natural monopoly. However, in competitive telecommunications
markets (such as some local business service, or long distance), rates will
fall. The winners in the deregulation of telecommunications will be busi-
nesses and higher toll users-or generally, the higher income groups. The
losers will be members of lower income groups and residents of rural
communities and, consequently, the statutory policy of universal service.
79
VI. ALTERNATIvES To REGULATION: TAXING & SPENDING, THE JUDICIARY,
AND ARTIFICIAL MARKETS
There are three major alternatives to regulation to accomplish ends
which society views as desirable ° and to allocate resources. These alternatives
are the power of taxing and spending, the relief which the judiciary may
provide, and the creation of artificial markets.
A. Taxing & Spending
If indeed there is some social benefit to be realized by transferring
wealth from large to small and from urban to rural, many economists argue
that the taxing and spending mechanism is the preferable vehicle for
accomplishing that objective. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 chose
77. See MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact
on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983); W.B. TuwsTA.L, DIscoNNEC N
PARTms: MAGAaNG T BamL SYsTEm BEAx-tw (1985); S. COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTRY,
THE BAKnup OF AT&T (1986).
78. Glesne, Status of Deregulation (Regulatory), in MoUNtAIN BunL AcADEMIc SEMINAR
81, 83 (1986).
79. See Dempsey, Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell With His Invisible Hands: Divestiture,
Deregualtion, and the Need for a New National Telecommunications Policy, I1 IHASINGS
ComMUmCATioNs & ENTERTAIaNENT L.J. (forthcoming 1989).
80. That is not to say that society always agrees as to what ends it should achieve.
Indeed, the public policy debate is to both ends and means.
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this approach to ensure continued essential air service to airports serving
smaller communities. That type of tax subsidization is jeopardized for the
same reasons that no new mechanism of tax subsidies has been implemented
for bus transportation. With a $2 trillion federal debt, and an annual deficit
in recent years of around $200 billion, the pragmatic political reality is that
the cost of additional subsidies cannot now be imposed on taxpayers.
But taxing might be a preferable means of forcing producers to inter-
nalize the costs of production. For example, rather than having government
regulators specify the precise technology to be employed in ridding the
environment of pollution, a tax imposed at a progressively higher rate for
higher levels of pollution might be a more efficient means of encouraging
producers to develop the technology best able to arrest pollution.8' Con-
versely, tax incentives may be employed to encourage producers to invest
in pollution abatement technology.
2
B. The Judiciary As Regulator
Others argue that the courts are a superior mechanism to the regulatory
agencies for the accomplishment of social objectives. For example, some
argue that the antitrust laws are a superior mechanism for correcting
anticompetitive conduct in the market. However, civil antitrust litigation is
expensive and time consuming, and the evidentiary hurdles are often for-
midable. A private litigant stands a better chance of winning when the U.S.
Department of Justice precedes the private action with a criminal enforce-
ment judgment. In such a situation, the Justice Department has already
undertaken the expensive burden of discovery, and thereby alleviated some
of the cost to the private plaintiff.
But in the Reagan Administration criminal antitrust actions against
companies engaging in anticompetitive conduct were relatively rare in areas
other than price fixing. Moreover, even if a private plaintiff prevails in
litigation, his recovery ordinarily is limited to monetary damages. If he has
been driven out of business, even trebled damages do not serve to restore
his presence in the marketplace. For example, when Sir Freddie Laker's
Skytrain was driven out of the transatlantic market, his creditors in bank-
ruptcy brought an antitrust action against a number of U.S. and foreign
airlines. The out-of-court settlement was generous. It put dollars in the
pockets of Sir Freddie and his creditors, but it did not resurrect Skytrain.
The net result was the loss of a vigorous price competitor on the North
Atlantic. 3 Thus, the consumer interest in preserving a competitive market-
place is rarely vindicated by antitrust remedies.
The problem of externalities, or spillover costs, discussed above, also
poses a difficult problem for the judiciary. Professors Breyer and Stewart
summed it up this way:
81. J. LAITOs, NArtuRA, RE oURcES LAw 116-17 (1985).
82. See Heinz, Tax Incentives for Pollution Control, 8 J. Colp. TAx. 83 (1981).
83. Dempsey, The International Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Passenger
Transportation, 17 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1978).
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[Court litigation is plagued with imperfections and limitations that
are especially pronounced in dealing with the problems of market
failure that arise in an urban, industrialized society. Certain forms
of market failure, such as air pollution, result in harms that are
widespread but too small in the case of any individual to justify
the expenses of a lawsuit to redress the harm. In some cases it may
be thought necessary to prevent the occurrences of serious harms,
such as those caused by unsafe drugs, through prophylactic measures
imposed in advance and continually policed; court damage awards
are imposed after harm has occurred and the capacity of courts to
devise comprehensive prophylactic injunctions and engage in on-
going monitoring and supervision is limited. Many forms of market
failure-for example, the 'spillover' problems generated by nuclear
power generation and the disposal of nuclear wastes-call for cen-
tralized, specialized, technically knowledgeable administration of
controls.1
4
In the absence of regulation, the unevenness of access to the judicial
forum (because not all members of society can afford a good lawyer) and
the uncertainty of result would likely cause producers to take less reasonable
and prudent care to avoid injury to workers or consumers. Producers'
absolute exposure would be less than the total injuries suffered, unless of
course, punitive damages ran wild. Moreover, society pays for injuries
indirectly in, for example, subsidies to hospitals, and risk pooling insurance
cross-subsidies. Cancer hospitals are full of patients who have no contri-
bution from, or actual knowledge of, the producers who injured them.
C. Artificial Markets
Among the more imaginative modern approaches which the government
has adopted to arrest the problem of externalities is the creation of artificial
markets. For example, giving polluters freely transferable discharge permits
allows the creation of a market for such permits so that pollution oppor-
tunities flow, so to speak, to their highest valued use. Similarly, under the
1977 Clean Air Amendments, new sources are required to "offset" existing
emissions in the area before they are allowed to produce new pollution.
Polluters, therefore, have an incentive to purchase existing polluting facili-
ties, and shut them down, or to donate pollution abatement equipment to
such facilities.85 Similarly, the "bubble" concept treats an area as a single
pollution source, requiring that aggregate pollution from multiple sources
within the "bubble" not rise above designated ceilings. 6
84. S. BRmsva & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGuLATORY POLICY 15 n.1l
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U- . FoRT., July 30, 1981, at 13. See also J. LArros, supra note 80, at 117.
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In 1987, the Department of Transportation created an artificial market
in "landing slots" at our nation's four slot constrained airports-Chicago
O'Hare, Washington National, New York Laguardia, and New York Ken-
nedy. Today, airlines may freely buy and sell landing and takeoff slots at
these airports. 87 Thus, while establishing overall ceilings on congestion for
purposes of safety and environmental regulation, the DOT has turned over
to the market the decision of which airline shall serve the airport.
VII. CONCLUSION
This is an era of crisis for the regulatory agencies. During the past
decade, federal deregulation and preemption have significantly changed the
legal environment. Similarly, techological change has had a profound impact
on the economic environment. As a consequence, we must reassess the
social and economic goals we wish regulation to accomplish, and here we
begin nearly from a clean slate. We must also devise the least obtrusive
means to accomplish those newly identified goals.
The national direction during the past decade has been away from
regulation. But it was not always so. During the 1930s and 1940s, the
economic collapse of the Great Depression followed by a foreign military
attack at Pearl Harbor and World War II, caused Americans to turn to
government to save the economy and save freedom. That generation viewed
government as a great friend whose vast power could be put to public
good.
But during the 1960s and 1970s, disillusionment with government swept
across the nation. The left was appalled by the war in Viet Nam and
Watergate. The right was dissatisfied with the Great Society, the tremendous
growth in social spending, bureaucratic red tape, and high taxes. The
national mass psychology became one of hostility to government. Govern-
ment had become the enemy.
Just as 18th century mercantilism gave birth to laissez faire, and 19th
century laissez faire gave birth to economic regulation, and 20th century
regulation gave birth to deregulation, undoubtedly deregulation will lead to
21st century reregulation. As surely as the pendulum of American public
policy swings, a nation which fails to learn from its history is doomed to
repeat it.8" Our nation has a terribly short memory.
It seems that idealistic faith in laissez faire as the perfect solution for
a complex society's problems runs the risk of jeopardizing its success in
creating the economies and efficiencies which flow from healthy competition.
By zealously taking the nation down the path of no government, deregu-
lation's proponents have created enormous dislocations, and a perception
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that the wealthy are its principal beneficiaries. The people will demand more
protection from their government than they are now getting, and they will
pull the pendulum away from full scale laissez faire toward a populist
sharing of economic opportunity.
The real choice is not between no government and all government. It
is simply a question of how much, and of what kind. In its darkest days,
regulation's heavy hand had a debilitating impact on the economy. If instead
of the heavy hand of regulation, we could achieve a delicate touch of
enlightened public policy, we might have the best of both worlds: the
economies and efficiencies of competitive capitalism, and the protection of
public interest values beyond allocative efficiency. Can we find a prudent
middle ground between excessive regulation and excessive laissez faire?
It is this careful adjustment of the appropriate level of government vis-
A-vis the market that poses the most challenging opportunity for creative
minds during the next decade. We must decide what we want government
to do, and devise carefully tailored mechanisms to accomplish those public
policy objectives. Government need not be the enemy. If properly harnessed,
government can be a great friend, one who inspires us to do more for the
common good.
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